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The United States of America is found-
ing its national security and military strate-
gies on three groups of activities, called
preparing, shaping and responding.
Responding capability refers to current
readiness of the armed forces to engage
and successfully annihilate open threats to
national security. That readiness was
assessed during the nineties according to
the military capability in successfully waging
and winning two almost simultaneous major
theater wars, like the one in Korea and in
The Gulf. The preparing aspect of the strat-
egy refers to modernization, restructuring
and continuous adaptations of the national
security system, in order to maintain its high
readiness and effectiveness against possible
future challenges. The development, acqui-
sition and exploitation cycle for major
weapon systems lasts for twenty to thirty or
more years. That is only one of the many
reasons why today’s decisions have far-
reaching consequences for the capabilities
of the armed forces in the next decades.
Environment shaping, sometimes called
luck management, is also a way to prepare
for the future. It consists of active engage-
ment in world affairs to prevent the devel-
opment of new major threats to American
and international security. 
With the fall of the Berlin Wall the only
threat from the ’A-list’ disappeared. The ’A-
list’ contains the most dangerous threats to
the existence of the USA and Western
world. The former Soviet Union had the
capability to destroy Western values and
Western order, but such an enemy to the
West no longer exists. The major part of US
defense planning is now directed towards
maintaining the capability to wage two
major theater wars. Such regional contin-
gencies might endanger American interests
and security, but would not question the
existence of the United States. Therefore,
wars of this type can be categorized in
belonging to the ’B-list’ of threats. Public
interest seems to be oriented mostly
towards the activities that deal with the ’C-
list’ of threats, like those in Bosnia-
Herzegovina or Kosovo. However, the ’A-
list’ may not remain clear forever. One of
the most important goals of the American
security system is to keep the ’A-list’ clear
as long as possible. Dr Perry and Dr Carter
argue that this is the essential element of
the preventive defense strategy, which they
theoretically developed at Harvard and
Stanford universities and practically
applied during their terms in the US gov-
ernment. 
Questions such as How might the
post-cold war era end?  How can the
United States prolong this period of
peace and influence?  How can we
ensure that if it must end, it ends grace-
fully, without cataclysm? and What is
the character of the era that will follow
it? define the fundamental long-term
strategic challenges of the post-cold war
era. The authors have identified five chal-
lenges of that type, which might evolve into
the ’A-list’ of threats. They defined these
dangers as follows:
- Russia might descend into chaos, iso-
lation, and aggression as Germany did
after World War I;
- Russia and the other Soviet successor
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states might lose control of the nuclear
legacy of the former Soviet Union;
- China could grow hostile rather than
becoming cooperatively engaged in
the international system;
- Weapons of mass destruction will
proliferate and present a direct military
threat to the United States; and
- “Catastrophic terrorism” of unprece-
dented scope and intensity might occur
on US territory. 
If the US responds to these dangers in
the right manner, it will be possible to real-
ize George C. Marshall’s vision of the
world not of threats to be deterred, but of a
world “united in peace, freedom, and
prosperity.” This is where the sixth key
threat to American security lies. That threat
lies in ignoring the previously identified five
potential dangers because of temporarily
advantageous power relations in the world.
Each chapter in the book is dedicated
to one of the six security challenges. The
chapters start with vivid and lively memo-
ries of Mr Perry at an event during his term
as the Secretary of Defense, which is rele-
vant to the topic. The main part of each
chapter consists of the problem analysis,
investigation of possible preventive strate-
gies, description of already taken steps,
and recommendations for future action.
These discussions are case studies of pre-
ventive defense mechanisms. To be suc-
cessful, preventive defense must combine
all the instruments of foreign policy: politi-
cal, economic and military. The exact type
of actions and means used in a particular
situation will depend on the circumstances,
but because of the character of activities
and capabilities of the American armed
forces, preventive defense falls primarily
into the military domain. 
In the case of Russian and Central
European stabilization, preventive defense
requires fostering military-to-military coop-
eration, promotion of the Partnership for
Peace Program, careful NATO enlarge-
ment, officer education, and appropriate
economic assistance. In the case of pre-
venting nuclear technology proliferation
from the former USSR, the expert and eco-
nomic assistance offered through the
Nunn-Lugar program provided for denu-
clearization of the Ukraine, Belarus and
Kazakhstan. Intercontinental ballistic mis-
siles are dismounted, nuclear material is
centrally stored, and employment pro-
grams for nuclear scientists are launched.
An important element of these efforts is
arms control negotiations, which resulted
in START treaties. These negotiations
should be continued.
American relations with China are not
sufficiently developed. Under the preven-
tive defense agenda, direct military cooper-
ation with China should be initiated, and
China should be more actively involved in
the search for solutions to global security
issues. Preventive defense against weapons
of mass destruction should rely not only on
international anti-proliferation treaties,
inspections and sanctions for those who do
not obey prescribed norms of behavior.
Active and passive defense measures must
be developed, and unstable regions should
be stabilized to decrease the incentive for
proliferation and acquisition of nuclear,
chemical or biological weapons.  
Regarding the prevention of cata-
strophic terrorism, the intelligence collec-
tion system should be restructured, new
analytical capabilities established, and new
and more effective methods for tracking
and prevention of that dangerous threat
invented. Finally, preventive defense
applied to the American armed forces is
embodied in the preparing activities. The
important role in that area is technological
modernization coupled with appropriate
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doctrine improvements and force restruc-
turing (which together forms the revolution
in military affairs). Equally important are
the changes in management of defense
assets (so called revolution in business
affairs), and sustainment of personnel
quality, training and motivation. 
The book deserves careful reading,
because the problems described do not
only influence United States security, but
the stability of the whole international com-
munity as well. The book will have signifi-
cant impact because of the high-quality
analysis provided and because of personal
influence of its authors.  Dr Perry and Dr
Carter today jointly lead a research project
at Harvard and Stanford universities on
preventive defense. Apart from being dis-
tinguished professors, they share significant
experience in public service, industry and
academia. It should be mentioned that
William Perry served as the US Secretary of
Defense from 1994 to 1997, and that Dr
Carter acted as Assistant Secretary for
Defense Policy in the same term. It was the
time when the first Quadrennial Defense
Review was prepared, which defined pre-
ventive actions aimed at shaping security
environment as one of the three pillars of
national security strategy. 
The book is also thought provoking for
readers from a small country such as the
Republic of Croatia. The book shows how
a global power like the United States views
its own and global security in the coming
decades. Due to the power and influence
of the United States in the international
community, its positions often define the
frame for political activities to other play-
ers. In that sense, the authors’ observations
on NATO enlargement and the role of the
Partnership for Peace are especially inter-
esting. The authors pledge for the
increased role of the PfP, which is too mar-
ginalized, and for the slower enlargement
of NATO. In their view, that would help to
avoid additional complications in relations
with Russia, while at the same time provide
some of the advantages that eastern
European countries expect from gaining
NATO membership. 
However, a more profound lesson of
the book may be in the method that the
authors use to contemplate strategic prob-
lems of national security. Elements of this
approach are: the classification of threats;
focus on those threats that might cause the
most serious consequences; the assess-
ment of shaping options and means; ana-
lytical thinking; integration of all elements
of national power; and long-term planning.
Such an approach is applicable to improve
the international and national security of
many countries in different positions, and
not only of a global power such as the
United States. 
Prof. dr. sc. Krešimir Æosiæ
mr. sc. Dra en Penzar
Institute for Defense Studies,
Research and Development
Ministry of Defense, 
Republic of Croatia
Bijenièka 46, 10000 Zagreb, Croatia
e-mail: dpenzar@public.srce.hr
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Robert M. Hayden’s Blueprints for a
House Divided: The Constitutional Logic
of the Yugoslav Conflicts sets out to
analyse the logic of the collapse of the for-
mer Yugoslav federation and the causes of
the ensuing war(s).  Hayden identifies two
sources of disintegration.  Firstly, he sug-
gests that the federation collapsed because
of the triumph of central European nation-
alism and concepts such as the nation-
state, pursued primarily by the Slovenes
and Croats.  Secondly, Hayden maintains
that the disintegration of Yugoslavia fol-
lowed a firm logic of constitutional propos-
als based on exclusionist, nationalist claims
that undermined the authority of the feder-
ation and produced structures of instability.
According to Hayden, the collapse of the
former Yugoslavia and the structures of the
resulting conflicts can all be explained as
the logical consequence of the adoption of
certain constitutional concepts.
The logic of disintegration according to
Hayden followed the pattern of constitu-
tional proposals by Slovenia and Croatia,
initially in the form of amendments to the
1974 Constitution of the Socialist
Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY),
and then through the proposals for the
transformation of Yugoslavia as a confed-
eration or alliance of sovereign states. The
former he believes led to the deconstitution
of the federation, while the latter was sim-
ply a ruse or a constitutional sham aimed
at reducing the power of the centre. He
then proceeds to critique the proposals for
a new constitutional arrangement and ter-
ritorial delimitation for the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina under the aus-
pices of the international peace confer-
ence.  Hayden lucidly but one-sidedly
examines the sequence from the European
Community’s proposals for cantons, the
Vance and Owen proposals for provinces,
the Owen and Stoltenberg proposals for
republics, and finally the Washington
agreements and the Dayton accords that
established entities and provisions for spe-
cial parallel relations. Hayden’s discussion
contains no distinction between the aggres-
sor and the victim, or any critique of the
Serbian imperative to use force to impose
their will and a political solution in Croatia
or Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The underlying basis of Hayden’s thesis
is the belief that crosscutting ties made
Yugoslavia a viable political community,
exemplified mainly by interethnic-mar-
riages.  Although Hayden dismisses the
claim that the nations that constituted for-
mer Yugoslavia were afflicted with inherent
incompatibilities that ultimately led to the
disintegration of the federation, he does
suggest the following:
What did prove to be incompatible
were republics based on the principle
of the sovereignty of the majority ethnic
“nation” (narod), formulations of the
essence of the state entered into the
constitutional systems of these
republics beginning in 1989.” (p. 3)
Hayden believes that a system of con-
stitutional nationalism, underpinning con-
stitutional amendments and proposals both
at the level of the republic and the federa-
tion, institutionalised a division between
those who are of the sovereign nation, eth-
nically defined, and those who are not.
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Under such circumstances, the latter may
hold citizenship but cannot aspire to equal-
ity.  Constitutional nationalism is defined as
a concept or process by which constitution-
al and legal structures privilege the mem-
bers of one (ethnic) nation over those of any
other resident in a particular state (p. 68).  A
state or republic, which adopts constitution-
al nationalism, envisions a state in which
basic sovereignty resides with a particular
nation (narod), the members of, which are
the ones who can decide fundamental
questions of state form and identity. Of
course, under Hayden’s analyses, the
Slovenes and Croats are guilty of institu-
tionalising constitutional nationalisms that
ultimately led to the disintegration of the
federation and produced systems of
inequality and discrimination of minorities.
Hayden uses Croatia as a case study to
demonstrate how the Serbian minority was
alienated and discriminated in the new
Constitution (1990) and by the new demo-
cratic government.  Indeed, the Croatian
government may be accused of not doing
enough, but the question is what could it
have done to avoid the Serbian rebellion
and Yugoslav army intervention? Too many
Serbian leaders have stated that they did
not want to live in an independent Croatian
state, and that the symbolism of Croatia
was not a factor, but an excuse.  Indeed,
Jovan Raškoviæ had complained after the
democratic elections that politics and socie-
ty in Croatia were “Croatocentric.”  This
absurd proposition could not be understood
except by the need to repress any manifes-
tation of Croatian identity and national
awareness that had been marginalized or
criminalized under the previous regime as
anti-state activity or hostile propaganda.
Indeed, Hayden does not discuss the efforts
of Croatia to bring the Serbian minority into
parliamentary and local representation.
And there is a huge gap in understanding
the mechanisms adopted by Croatia to
provide for local autonomy and human
rights for all its minorities under the aus-
pices of the Constitutional law on national
minorities.  Indeed, the entire negotiating
process after the adoption of the Vance
plan and the UN protected areas, the
UNCRO mandate and the implementation
of the UNTAES temporary authority is left
out.  Croatia’s position was that the
Serbian minority could not secede from
Croatia, and that they could aspire to
greater political representation according
to the 1991 census both at the national
and local levels.  To exhaust the omissions,
Hayden does not examine the process that
led to the Zagreb 4 (Z4) agreement, which
in effect created a state within a state.
Croatia only took this proposal as a basis
for discussion, but it clearly was unwork-
able.  It did, however, demonstrate the
extent to which the Serbs (in the occupied
areas) would go to rejecting peaceful inte-
gration and the level of autonomy that they
would accept.
After reading Hayden’s analyses, one is
left with the impression that the Western
republics, namely Slovenia and Croatia, by
pursuing their objectives in transforming
the federation into a modern, confedera-
tion or alliance of sovereign states, set off
an unstoppable process of disintegration.
The book suffers from historical myopia,
because there is no discussion of the histo-
ry of Yugoslavia’s battle to define itself
internally.  There were protracted debates
about whether the first Yugoslavia would be
defined as a republic or a kingdom, or
whether it would be the State or Kingdom
of the Serbs, Slovenes and Croats, or just
of Yugoslavia.  And then the debates over
the banovina, decentralisation and cen-
tralisation/unitarism, and the Croatian
banovina.  Hayden also fails to discuss the
ZAVNOH and AVNOJ principles that con-
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solidated the federal basis of post-war
Yugoslavia.  While his initial purpose may
not be to write a history of constitutionalism
in former Yugoslavia, eliding over these
important debates and formulations seri-
ously distorts the picture of a snap-shot of
1989 and beyond.  At that point, and under
the successive constitutions after the Second
World War, the republics were defined
under the republican and federal constitu-
tions as states whose borders were unable
to be changed without the ratification of the
Parliaments of the republics.
Hayden also neglects the complex
negotiations between Croatia and Slovenia
over the formulation of the joint confedera-
tion proposal.  And he also neglects to dis-
cuss the exhausting negotiations between
the republican leaderships that worked
towards articulating the extent to which they
disagreed over the future of Yugoslavia.
Indeed, the Presidency of the SFRY mandat-
ed the republics to present their visions of a
new relationship, and special working
groups were established to examine pro-
posals for resolving the constitutional and
political crisis that emerged after the col-
lapse of communism.  
It is interesting to note that Hayden
spends too much time defending his schol-
arship and perspective.  Indeed, three years
in Belgrade does not equip one with any
special understanding of the crisis, particu-
larly not of the perspective as seen by
Slovenes, Croats, Muslims qua Bosniacs,
Macedonians or the Kosovo Albanians.
And most fundamentally, Hayden does not
ask the basic question about the axis of ten-
sions and competing visions.  Why are all,
and now including the Montenegrins, the
nations aspiring to their own political auton-
omy or independence from Serbia?  By
omitting to discuss the Serbian perspective
and role in the disintegration of the federa-
tion (for example the influence over the mil-
itary, incursions into Yugoslavia’s monetary
system for exclusively Serbian purposes,
unilateral abolition of the autonomy of
Vojvodina and Kosovo, and failing to
accept the Croatian delegate in the SFRY
Presidency according to the principle of
rotation, amongst others).   Indeed, there is
little or no discussion of the Memorandum
of the Serbian Academy of Science and
Arts, a document that is widely viewed as
the blueprint for the destruction of
Yugoslavia.  
When Hayden discusses the constitu-
tional proposals for the reorganisation of
Yugoslavia, one is left wondering why the
proposal for a modern federation submit-
ted by Serbia and Montenegro is omitted.
This proposal is interesting for many rea-
sons, especially because it outlines Serbia’s
position on a new Yugoslavia.  For consti-
tutional lawyers, it is interesting that
Croatia and Slovenia proposed not ’seces-
sion’, but disassociation and association as
mechanisms for negotiating a confedera-
tion of sovereign states.  The Serbian pro-
posal, however, explicitly defines the
republics as states which exercise some of
their sovereign rights in the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia and are independ-
ent in discharging the rights and duties
established in their constitutions and in
organising state government of their territo-
ries.  Under article 10 of the Serbian pro-
posal, every “republic has the right, on the
grounds of the will expressed by the citizens
in a referendum, to decide to secede from
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.”  The
proposal also spells out the mechanisms
for secession, which is an odd provision as
the official representatives of Serbia claim
that they tried to save Yugoslavia from the
’separatist’ Slovenes and Croats.
Interesting enough, a special working
group of experts formed by the Presidency
of the SFRY at the end of February 1991,
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prepared a draft document on the constitu-
tional crisis, as well as a draft constitutional
and legal procedure for secession from
Yugoslavia.  The latter document spelled
out that the right of nations to self-determi-
nation is one of the universal rules of mod-
ern law that is also enshrined in the
Yugoslav Constitution.  However, the draft
noted that the Constitution does not specify
the rule or operational procedure for imple-
menting the right of nations to secede from
the SFRY.  The draft suggested amendments
to the Yugoslav Constitution, which includ-
ed, inter alia, the following provisions:
The right of initiative for secession is
vested in the Parliaments of the
Republics.
The decision on an initiative will go to a
referendum by all the citizens of the
republic.
The referendum is valid if over half the
total electorate has opted in its favour.
In the republics inhabited by members
of several Yugoslav nations the neces-
sary majority is likewise determined for
each Yugoslav nation in particular.  If
one of the Yugoslav nations declares
itself against, all settlements where this
nation is in the majority, and which bor-
der on the other part of Yugoslav terri-
tory and may therefore constitute a
compact territory, remain within the
structure of the SFRY.
If the result of the referendum is nega-
tive, the same issue may be brought up
again only after the expiry of a period of
five years.
Under this procedure, the Federal
Executive Council would draw up a balance
of division of jointly created assets and
properties of the federation, as well as draw
up proposals for territorial delineation and
determine the frontiers of the future states
and other questions of importance to the
determination of the act of secession.
These provisions for secession were
clearly drawn up for Croatia with a view to
parts of the republic seceding to remain in
the federation.  The big question was the
future status of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, which could also withdraw
while parts of its population and territory
join the Yugoslav federation.  Ironically, the
Bosnian Muslims and Serbs in July 1991
proposed the resolution of the crisis based
on an “historical agreement.”  The Muslims
proposed to the Serbs—without informing
or including the Croats—that they are
“interested in a democratic solution to the
status and rights of the Serbian nation in
Croatia, and that we support their efforts
for autonomy, as we support autonomy for
the Muslim/Bosniac nation in Sand ak. To
the extent that the Serbian nation express-
es, and realises it legitimately, a desire not
to live within the framework of a Croatian
state, and expresses a desire for the Knin
Krajina to join Bosnia and Herzegovina, we
shall then raise the issue of enjoining both
Sand aks with Bosnia and Herzegovina.”  
The most interesting aspects of
Hayden’s examination is the role of essen-
tially European concepts of the nation-state
and the role of the international communi-
ty in “imposing” from outside values, ideas
and concepts that are foreign to the
“locals.”  However, Hayden does not deal
with these issues with any depth or con-
vincingly.  Had he tried to grapple with
these issues rather than place the blame
with the Slovenes, Croats and Muslims in
wanting to reorganise a failed state struc-
ture according to modern European demo-
cratic standards and processes, scholars of
international relations and constitutional
law would be better served in understand-
ing the logics of disintegration of the for-
mer Yugoslav federation.
Marijan Gubiæ, Zagreb, Croatia
Book Reviews R. M. Hayden
222 NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE FUTURE 1(1) 2000.
Daniel Patrick Moynihan (1998).
Secrecy: The American
Experience.
Introduction by Richard Gid
Powers. 
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Secrecy is for losers. For people
who do not know how important the
information really is. -
Daniel P. Moynihan
In his book Secrecy, US Senator D.P.
Moynihan sharply criticises the American
government’s secrecy. Drawing on the his-
tory of this institution’s development,
Moynihan attacks its legal framework and
its function within the American political
system, viewing it as one of the key char-
acteristics of the governing methods of the
executive. His work is a plea for abandon-
ing the current situation, which he calls the
”Culture of Secrecy”, and for the establish-
ment and acceptance of the alternative,
”Culture of Openness”.
However, Moynihan does not entirely
discard the need for a certain degree of
secrecy in a state’s affairs and claims his
intention is not to abolish secrecy, which is
indeed “sometimes legitimate and neces-
sary”. Why then does Moynihan so force-
fully attack and destructively criticize the
institution of secrecy? 
First, Moynihan does not attack the
concept of secrecy as such, which would be
in the least impractical. However, he does
attack secrecy in its bureaucratised form
and manifestations as the institution of a
modern democratic state.  Second, his
harsh criticism, which arises in part from his
general view on freedom and democracy
as well as from the dubiousness of the rela-
tionship between secrecy and freedom, has
one concrete practical dimension; namely,
the expensive American bureaucratised
secrecy system and the intelligence-security
Leviathan which rests on it have not,
according to Moynihan, fulfilled their only
purpose in the second half of the twentieth
century: correctly assessing the degree of
threat to American national security from its
main Cold War enemy, the USSR.
Continual intelligence overestimates of
Soviet strength and then being caught
unprepared by its dissolution are the cardi-
nal sins which lie in the most distorted
aspect of the ”Culture of Secrecy”; in other
words, the withholding of information for
reasons of scientific pretensions; that is to
say, closed intelligence analyses and
assessments which did not allow for expert
dialogue and criticism. Moynihan, who is
not only a politician but also a social sci-
entist, shows us how contradictory secrecy
is to the essence of scientific discourse.
Moynihan’s likeable style of describing
various episodes from America’s most
recent history helps to illustrate his basic
arguments. The making of the modern
American secrecy system during WW I; the
extent of Soviet espionage before, during
and after WW II; ominous complementari-
ty of the concepts of secrecy, conspiracy
and loyalty, and the expansion of the secre-
cy system with the onset of the nuclear age;
the Pentagon Papers; the Iran-Contra affair
are just a few of the elaborated themes.
One of the most fascinating and, from the
perspective of the American reception of
Moynihan’s work, the most controversial
parts of the book, is the author’s presenta-
tion of the current decline in the quality of
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strategic analysis regarding the Soviet threat
to American national security. Moynihan
believes that George F. Kennan’s article,
“The Sources of Soviet Conduct”, which
was published in Foreign Affairs in July
1947, is the best insight of its kind or, rather,
“the most prescient position paper in the
history of modern American diplomacy.”
Moynihan also covers various classified
assessments inaccessible to expert criticism
and discussions, assessments which have
for decades served as a basis for political
decision-making, and which vastly exagger-
ated the power of the USSR, until the final
debacle:  being caught unprepared by the
breakdown of the Soviet empire.
Moynihan simultaneously follows two
processes, illustrating them with numerous
examples - on the one hand the process of
establishing and developing an American
secrecy system, and on the other hand, the
parallel battle of the public and the parlia-
ment to restrain this institution; that is, to
define the level of regulation which would
serve to effectively resist an enemy, but
which at the same time would not be used
against one’s own citizens and their liber-
ties, whether it be in the form of bureau-
cratic inertia or political misuse.
In places where Moynihan the social
scientist argues for demolishing the
“Culture of Secrecy” and developing a
“Culture of Openness”, Moynihan the
politician demands the establishment of a
new, more stable model of decision-making
in the area of national security. The old
model, grounded on secrecy, with its legacy
of intelligence failures and ill-conceived
political moves, must yield to a new way of
addressing the national security issue; that
is, shifting the emphasis from secrecy to
analysis. Because he has confidence in the
beneficial effects of the “Information Age”
in which we live, the civilizational founda-
tion of a “Culture of Openness”, Moynihan
is thus confident in the intelligence value of
open sources.
He is of course practical and hence
does not rely solely on invisible historical
powers, but on the legislative activity of a
democratic state as well: the manner in
which one must restrain a “Culture of
Secrecy” and allow for the development of
a “Culture of Openness” is a law that
would clearly define and limit the area of
secrecy.
To be sure, we must allow for the pos-
sibility that there exist authors, mostly
American, who would successfully oppose
some of Moynihan’s arguments and show,
on the basis of thorough analysis of intelli-
gence assessments, that their history is not
entirely comprised of dramatic failures.
However, a critical approach to
Moynihan’s work, as well as to his lack of
modesty (he presents his former scepticism
in regard to the long-term survival of com-
munist totalitarianism as one of the rare
bright spots in the darkness of delusions
about Soviet strength and invincibility) do
not lessen the value of Moynihan’s other
arguments, his support for a ”Culture of
Openness” and his strong, morally and
intellectually principled stands in the
defence of democracy and civil liberties.
Moynihan’s text is preceded by an
excellent introduction by Richard Gid
Powers, in which he sketches Moynihan’s
political portrait and interprets the meaning
of his efforts in light of critical consideration
of the Cold War’s tangle of facts and illu-
sions wrapped in a veil of secrecy, and the
epochal clash of the two superpowers over
the shortage of valid information-based
hysterias - the right wing ideology of anti-
communism and the left ideology of anti-
anti-communism, as one of the main char-
acteristics of modern American history.
However, even though he looks at
secrecy from the perspective of an
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“American experience”, Moynihan’s work is
of exceptional value for the non-American
readers too, especially those in the Central
Eastern European “transitional laboratory”.
Namely, while the American reader finds
this book predominantly, although not
solely, polemical and politically provoca-
tive, for this other group of potential read-
ers the book is first of all didactic, since this
is the area where there are deep structural
changes being undertaken in all aspects of
social life, and thus the reconsideration of
the concept of national security and the
reorganising of systems and mechanisms
for its protection are underway. For all that,
in areas where a fundamental breakdown
of the old totalitarian system and a rejec-
tion of its methods in the area of national
security are occurring (that is, in the best
case scenario), some of the already existing
models from the West are being accepted
as an alternative, and the very fact that they
are western models necessarily assumes
the democratic legitimation of these mod-
els and methods. Moynihan’s work implic-
itly reminds us of the important historical
lesson that when “human affairs” are in
question, there are no ready-made and
self-explanatory solutions; that when it is
once achieved, democracy is not a self-
maintaining “natural state” but rather
needs continual nurturing, and, finally that
any measure of freedom, regardless of the
form it might take, should always be fought
for. Therefore Moynihan’s concern for
American democracy is a concern for
democracy in general.
Stribor Kikerec, Zagreb, Croatia
Compilation of Papers and
Studies (1997). Geopolitical
Reality of the Serb Nation.
Belgrade: Institute for Geopolitical
Studies. pp. 606.
ISBN 86-82985-02-0.
“Geopolitical Reality of the Serb
Nation” is a compilation of essays and
studies presented at the Round Table dis-
cussions entitled “The Serb Nation in the
New Geopolitical Environment” held in
Petrovaradin in January 1997, organized
by the Institute for Geopolitical Studies. It
contains 66 contributions written and/or
presented by Serb philosophers, econo-
mists, sociologists, experts in political sci-
ences, geography, demography, law, theol-
ogy, ethics, and professional military per-
sonnel from FRY and Republika Srpska,
and other academic institutions. Even
though three years have passed since this
symposium was held, the views expressed
by Serb political and academics draw not
only on the spirit of that time but also show
the habitual thinking of the Serb political
elite.
These works have been divided into the
following four chapters: The influence of
great powers on the position of the Serb
nation; Positioning the Serb nation in rela-
tion to their direct geopolitical surround-
ings; Assessments relating to the influence
of domestic factors on the overall Serb
position; Serb responses to their geopoliti-
cal challenges.
In his introduction Radovan Radinoviæ
touches on the central thesis of these works
- the view that Serbia is in its currently
unfavourable position as a direct result of
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America’s desire to dominate Europe and
the Balkans. Radinoviæ describes another
geopolitical theory that the newly united
Germany in its attempt to counteract the
Turkish expansion towards Europe and the
Balkans, is itself trying to expand its influ-
ence towards the Middle East. The authors
are united in viewing Russia as the only Serb
ally, but all agree that in its present form is
too weak to resist Western powers.
Radinoviæ views the states surrounding
Serbia, namely Albania, Croatia, and
Bosnia and Herzegovina, as being anti-Serb
orientated. For the majority of authors, the
break up of the former Yugoslavia has
resulted in the loss of “Serb ethnic territory”,
and has thus reopened the Serb nationalist
question. Furthermore, they conclude that
the only answer to this question is the cre-
ation of a Serb national country. The disin-
tegration of the former Yugoslavia for these
authors does not represent the final step in
the Balkanisation process, contending that
geopolitical tailoring is still ongoing.
According to the authors the process has
not been completed due to the varying
geopolitical concepts in the international
community regarding the division of the
Balkans. In addition, they note that each
change in relations between these powers
places the Balkans deeper into their “whirl-
wind of contradicting interests” (Smilja
Avranov p. 49).
The authors also allege that the great
powers, in their view had by the United
States, are endeavouring to minimalize the
geopolitical importance of Serbia.
Radinoviæ states that America is the main
obstacle in establishing a Serb state and
realizing their national interests. He lists the
Dayton agreement, Croatia’s military oper-
ation “Storm” and western support of
“Kosovo Albanian separatist ambitions” as
arguments supporting this view. Radinoviæ
defines Bosnia and Herzegovina in this
post-Dayton era as “an American multieth-
nic fixation” (p.29). Smilja Avranov
describes the United States, France and
Great Britain as new enemies of the Serb
nation emerging from the newly strength-
ened ties between the United States and the
Vatican. The United States and the Vatican,
according to Avranov, are together deci-
sively anti-communists coupled with the
Vatican’s anti-Orthodox stand.
Mihail Markoviæ describes the current
global situation after the fall of the USSR as
the “New World Order” (NWO), which has
allowed the Americans to dominate, shape
the world and exploit the world’s resources.
In establishing the NWO the United States
have attempted to create smaller states
incapable of fending off political domina-
tion and economic exploitation. Drago
Kalajiæ holds that Serb territory will eventu-
ally play the key role in determing the suc-
cess of the NWO, in other words, the rul-
ing of the “Third American Imperial” (p.
63). Text contributors criticise the South
European Cooperation Initiative (SECI) as
an attempt by the United States to separate
South Eastern Europe and bring it closer to
the demographically larger Turkey and the
Islamic world (pp. 68-69). Markoviæ also
maintains that the United States is empha-
sising a “Hegemony” period due to their
“painful losses in Vietnam as a leading
world military power making them ill pre-
pared to handle even the smallest loss of
human life and thus, if the problem is not
settled by bombing they retreat in front of a
decisive resistance,” (p. 57). 
Ratibor Grujiæ maintains that the
“most painful point in Serb history is the
resistance by the great powers towards
united Serbs and their desire to form a unit-
ed Serb state” (p. 72). Marko Markoviæ
claims that the aim of the NWO is to
destroy Yugoslavia, Russia and other
Orthodox countries and Orthodoxy as a
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whole. This NWO would not allow
European countries their independence
because “American domination does not
only mean death to a country’s independ-
ence but death to its rights and democra-
cy,” (p. 86). Following the destabilisation of
Russia, Markoviæ predicts that the next
stage involves the spread of “Pan-Islamism”
to the rest of Europe. Rajko Gnjato believes
that Russia is not only disoriented and lack-
ing the power to stop the execution of
NWO politics, but is also too weak to
secure it’s own interest within the NWO.
According to Dragoljub R. ivojinoviæ,
the Vatican is high on the list of Serb rivals,
who have been striving to regain their
dominant religious, political and social
power in Europe since the fall of the USSR.
When discussing international rela-
tions, the authors often stress the inferiority
of the European countries in respect to the
United States. Marko Markoviæ deems that
Europe no longer exists but is rather a
group of nations under American control.
Slobodan Samard iæ emphasises that the
European Union through bad arbitration
has disqualified itself as a competent ele-
ment in the Yugoslavia crisis. Contrary to
Europe’s strategy, the “American military-
political strategy is comprised of a mixture
of ideological multiculturalism and real
politics fuelling the (Yugoslav) crisis at low
intensity.” Thus the United States holds
state-territorial and international minority
disputes in regions such as Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Sand ak, Kosmet and west-
ern Macedonia as “principally unresolv-
able”.
Turkey’s influence in the Balkans has
also significably destabilised Serbia.
Miloljub Jevtiæ describes “Pan-Turkism” as
the concept of a Greater Turkey, where
Turkey with the support of the United States,
enters the Balkans, destabilizes first Serbia
and then Europe. In this case Kosovo
would serve as the primary foothold for
“Pan-Turkism” while Albania would supply
the second stepping stone, partly because
of their historical ties to Turkey and partly
due to the several million Turks of Albanian
descent.
Yugoslavia’s neighboring countries are
habitually seen as threats to the Serb state.
Miloš Kne eviæ states that the Serb nation
has the historical fate of suffering “stress-
generating geography”. Kne eviæ further
claims that the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (FRY) has been forced into the
only remaining portion of the Serb ethnic
area located in the eastern part of the for-
mer Yugoslavia. The geopolitical insecurity
of Serb territory lies, amongst other factors,
in the their neighbor’s varied ultranational-
ist goals of revision, territorial demands
and spiritual retaliation. These countries
are viewed as Austro-Hungarian and
Turkish political proxies.
Miloš Kne eviæ states that the Serb
question has not been addressed and that
the division of former Yugoslav territory into
secessionist new states has not been com-
pleted. (Unlike the Badinteur Commission
report which concluded that dissolution of
former Yugoslavia as succession, the
author claims that it is secession.) Kne eviæ
believes the emergence of smaller Balkan
states is in the face of the two century old
Serb geopolitical goal of reclaiming con-
trol of the “Serb ethnic area” (SEA). The
SEA is wider, as constantly described in
their papers, than the currently held territo-
ries of Serbia and Montenegro. “Thus
today’s confused situation is not in accor-
dance with the traditional Serb territories
of FRY and Republika Srpska, and in this
form geopolitically unnatural and in the
long term unviable,” (p. 211). Kne eviæ
states that the Serb area has been reduced
by Croatia (the so called Krajina) by
17,000 km2 and by 10,000 km2 in western
Bosnia (p. 211). Kne eviæ states that the
SEA is incomplete because the Serb nation
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lacks political integrity and strength.
The authors see Croatia in an incon-
venient geopolitical position with character-
istics of “being exposed and attractive for
take-overs” (p. 231). In short they view
Croatia as being unjustly interested in con-
trolling the Danube right bank. They go on
to term the Croatia’s Danube Region (which
was peacefully integrated in 1996-1997
after the signing of the basic agreement in
which the UNTAES aided) as the Srijem-
Baranja region and treat it as a temporary
neighbour. Drago M. Njegovan stresses the
importance of the Danube right bank for the
FRY, referring to it as part of the “Serb
Danube Region”. According to Njegovan,
the “Serb Danube Region” is wider by
including the Danube bank in both Croatia
and Romania (p. 334). The Serbs figured
that in the event of Yugoslavia’s break up
the Croatian Danube region would be
included in Serbia, however this plan is tem-
porarily unachievable. “The alternative
would be to retain the status quo, which in
the right circumstance would allow for the
aforementioned plan.” The authors con-
clude that Serb weakness and powerless-
ness has resulted in Croatia’s superiority in
the South Slav area.
Albania is defined as an “undesirable
Balkan infant”, a “Balkan geopolitical neu-
rotic”, and most expressively as the “Balkan
Banana Republic”. The new Serb geopoliti-
cal enemy has emerged as a result of the
separatist movement by the “unloyal
Albanian minority” living on Serb territory.
An additional problem is the fact that
“Serbia was unable to create a state pro-
gram that would adapt and include the
Kosovar Albanians in the Serb national
state” (p. 215). The problem according to
the authors is not in international relations
but rather highlighting the “Albanian” terror-
istic, criminal, mafia and political activities.
Macedonia is seen as a markedly weak
state incapable of sustaining itself inde-
pendently. In order to retain it’s own state,
Macedonia would have to enter into a
favorable alliance or succumb to the pro-
tection of a stronger state. Milovan
Radakoviæ claims that Albania and
Macedonia are prospective for the
strongest American military bases in
Europe. From these bases the United States
would have the capability of provoking low
intensity conflicts if they assess that politi-
cal, economic and military integration is
not heading in a favourable direction, or if
a united Europe starts to jeopardise
American interests (p. 350).
The authors allege that Bosnia and
Herzegovina does not have a foundation
outside of Yugoslavia. According to
Radinoviæ, Bosnia is the “Balkan black
hole” (p. 226) whose solution lies in a new
military conflict and not a peaceful agree-
ment where the Serbs would have to
defend minimal national and state inter-
ests. Bosnian-Muslims are seen as tempo-
rary neighbors while Republika Srpska is
seen as an apparent neighbor (p. 195).
FRY-Republika Srpska relations are termed
as an issue of domestic nature rather than
foreign affairs. This question must be
answered in such a way as to “name and
confirm it as a complete national and state
unity. The same nation resides in the FRY
and Republika Srpska in this continuous
Serb territory” (p. 226). From the Serb
standpoint, according to Rajko Gnjata,
Republika Srpska is the only bright out-
come from the disintegration of Yugoslavia.
Problems in relations with neighbour-
ing states lie primarily in defining the Serb
ethnic area (SEA). Jovan Iliæ claims that the
SEA is constituted by the following border
limits: Draè-Struga-Prilep-Veleška Klisura-
Osogovske mountains to the south the
existing Bulgaria-Serbian border (Stara
Planina)-Ðerdap; Èerne gorge-Mureš near
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Arada - Baja - Meèek - Drava at Barèa -
west Bilogora; Èazma - Sava upstream
from Sisak - Vukomerièke Gorice -
umberaèka Gora (Gornjaci) - Gornja
Kupa - Gorski Kotar - Rijeka - Adriatic Sea.
According to the authors, the SEA encom-
passed over half of Bosnia and
Herzegovina and a fourth of Croatia at the
beginning of the 90s. During the war they
“lost” approximately 12,000 km2 in
Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and
a grand total of 25,000 km2 after the rein-
tegration of the Croatian Danube region.
Radinoviæ goes on to describe the SEA as
including Serbia, Montenegro, Republika
Srpska (before NATO bombing around 70
percent of Bosnia and Herzegovina) and
the Republika Srpska Krajina, with the Srem
- Baranja region (the entire area in the
Republic of Croatia controlled by the JNA
and rebel Serbs during 1991-1995). “In
the forthcoming period, the Serbian military
elite and the entire Serb nation will have to
invest an enormos amount of effort to
regain this lost area and resettle it with
Serbs,” (p. 411).
Serbs do not have the strength, state
desire, nor the external geopolitical condi-
tions to return the “lost Serb kingdom” to its
entirety in the near future. “Regardless of
this, no one is allowed, not even the ruling
Serb elite, to permanently re-enunciate
their right to that area and to view this loss
as definite,” (p. 286). The Serb nation must
continue to regard this area as an inalien-
able historical right, and this stand must
also be pursued by Serb diplomacy in their
international political and diplomatic
strategies.
Samard iæ views the uniting of the FRY
and Republika Srpska as a kind of national
goal unimplementable today, but which
must be projected as a strategic national
interest (p. 130). Ðorðe B. Popoviæ thinks
that Serbia, to change its position, must
wait for a change in international relations.
Serbs in Croatia, Macedonia and Bosnia
and Herzegovina “have to try to survive”
until the FRY regains its strength to the
point where they can influence the Serb
people in those areas. However, until then,
it is important to work on the return of
refugees, “without whom all talks of Serb
land and demands for it’s future are point-
less” (p. 139-140).
The most worrisome issues for the
author’s are Serbia’s domestic problems.
Popoviæ specifies the 700,000 refugees in
Serbia over the Drina and the additional
problem of 200,000 military draftees who
fled to the West, as further worsening the
geopolitical position of the FRY. Milena
Spasovski claims that Serbia’s natural
growth is almost all attributed to Muslim
residents (Muslim, Albanians, Gypsies, and
Turks). The Serbs who have settled between
1991 - 1995 have only a short-term influ-
ence and in the long run they would not
significantly improve the currently negative
demographic development trends.
Miloš Kne eviæ states that FRY is lack-
ing in political, ideological, national, party
and geopolitical consensus regarding
important issues for their future. The Serb
political pseudoelite, instead of represent-
ing Serb integrity, represent “A Serb based
Yugoslav integrity” (p.197). Dragoljub
Kojèiæ suppresses that the most important
goal is to strengthen their Serb national
sovereignty and consequently establish a
Serb national state (p. 271). eljko
Poznanoviæ stresses the importance of the
Serb Orthodox Church as a vital internal-
integral Serb leader. Poznanoviæ maintains
that their religious belief cannot be sepa-
rated from the national, and thus the Serb
nation receives “Godly dimensions through
the national auto cephalic church” (p. 305-
306). Petar Stojiæ holds Kosovo and
Sand ak as priceless to the FRY and that
they must be maintained at all costs, even
if that means war. He suggests that they are
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threatening war in light of the direct ties
between the ever increasing aggressive
Islam and “Albanian” terrorism.
The FRY when speaking of Kosovo and
Sand ak must not allow itself to succumb to
the demands of the international communi-
ty because that would mark the end of its
national and state politics. Kosta Èavoški
sees the role of the international communi-
ty in Kosovo as supporting Albanians in
their aim of achieving political autonomy
and separation from the FRY, and not as
protecting human rights. The Serb political
corpus is deeply divided and shattered
according to Andrej Miletiæ (p. 371).
Radovan Radinoviæ sees their goal of
defining the SEA as the greatest challenge
confronting Serbs. Their aim is to create a
unique area of Serb land and then stabilis-
ing social development, demographic revi-
talisation and spiritual renewal. It also
improved integral security system whose
new doctrine includes the capability of
offensive responses against all aggressors,
and even against multinational powers with
the support of a strong ally. Radinoviæ feels
that the first step is to clear up the question
of the SEA borders and the Serb state. The
mentioned area has external pressures that
“refer to it in different terms, but the area
has to be seen as a unique ethnic area, with
mutual territorial connections, and entirety
with clear aspirations that would one day be
included in the unique Serb state” (p. 488).
Radinoviæ asserts that minorities in this state
would not have the right to claim their own
national state nor political autonomy.
Forcefully taken and abducted, Serb territo-
ry must be viewed as a temporary loss and
thus Serbs must continue to base their
hopes on their historical rights and demand
the return of these areas from the interna-
tional community when the moment
becomes visible for favorable Serb strategic
moves.
The authors hope that Russia will
remain/become a military ally of the FRY
and secure a guarantee for their smallest
strategic interests (p. 497). “Alliance with
Russia is a necessary requisite for avoiding
a most unfavorable military situation of a
multinational military NATO or WEU inter-
vention” (p. 497). Without this kind of
alliance the FRY would be lost in such a
military conflict, having to deal with a large
number of casualties, material losses and
destruction (p. 497). In 1999, FRY leaders
obviously did not heed this warning.
Branislav Ðorðeviæ summarizes that the
Serb state is surrounded by hostile coun-
tries, of which the Repulic of Croatia would
always play the role of mediator in a war of
great powers against the FRY. However,
Albania is viewed as the next Serb oppo-
nent. Serb countries outside of the FRY
must serve the role of vital subsystems for
the defence of the FRY and vice versa.
The Yugoslav Army (JA) must be capa-
ble of starting and concluding a war, and
also be prepared for war activities in neigh-
boring territories who are conducting
armed aggression on the FRY (p. 496). The
military doctrine should allocate means for
devastating attacks to all vital facilities of
neighboring countries if the Serb nation is
threatened. The JA must be prepared to
attack all vital facilities of the aggressor
and facilities of neighboring countries
involved. The FRY must have a suitable ally
derived from perhaps the Balkan Alliance,
Partnership for Peace or the Alliance of
Orthodox countries in Eastern Europe (p.
571).
Most of this compilation is persuaded
dominated by theories of American con-
spiracy sparsed with German and Vatican
activities directed against the Serb people.
Their feelings of endangerment are height-
ened by Russia’s weakness. The authors
maintain that the Serb people are victims
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due to their geopolitical, transit and reli-
gious uniqueness, which subjects them to
the bullying of great powers. Almost all of
their neighbors are now controlling at least
some section of the SEA, while the nation-
al minority in FRY is attempting to divide
the remaining areas and annex them to
their base states. The Serb political elite is
obviously still dealing with the after conse-
quences of the disintegration of the former
Yugoslavia and the fact that this state has
shrunk in size. However, their aspirations of
constructing a united Serbia using a some-
what smaller area of the former Yugoslavia
still exists. Regardless of their embitterment
towards a number of member countries of
the international community, the Serbs feel
that it is important to obtain support from
the world’s central power because it is the
only “just solution to the Serb national
question” (p. 430). Even though the actual-
ization of a new Serb state uniting the SEA
territory (returning parts of Croatia, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Macedonia and
Albania, etc.) is not possible right now in
their new geopolitical state, this idea must
still remain the key geopolitical aim of the
Serb political elite and therefore their
efforts must be directed towards this objec-
tive.
Josip Esterajher, Zagreb, Croatia
Blaskovich J. Anatomy of Deceit.
An American Physician s First-
hand Encounter with the
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During the last couple of years, several
books on the war in former Yugoslavia
were published in the United States.
However, all those books offered only one-
sided descriptions of the war. Blaskovich’s
book is the first one to present the other
side of the story.
Dr Jerry Blaskovich was born in
Chicago, Illinois. In 1960, he started study-
ing medicine at the Zagreb University
School of Medicine. He specialized derma-
tology in the United States where he also
got his master’s degree, but in a complete-
ly different field – the history of Islamic art.
Until 1994, he lectured on dermatology at
the University of Southern California. He is
a veteran of the Korean War and the field
of his special interest is chemical warfare.
Since the beginning of the conflict in former
Yugoslavia, he visited combat zones sever-
al times, evaluating the medical services,
visiting the refugee camps, and talking to
the victims of rape. He wrote numerous let-
ters and articles on the war in Croatia and
Bosnia and Herzegovina, which were pub-
lished in American journals and newspa-
pers, and he held many lectures. On the
basis of his own experience, he wrote a
book “Anatomy of Deceit – An American
Physician’s First Hand Encounter with the
Realities of the War in Croatia”, published
in the United States in July 1997.
231
“Anatomy of Deceit” is divided in four-
teen chapters, and the Croatian edition has
a special preface written by Prof. Andrija
Hebrang, MD, PhD, Minister of Health dur-
ing the war. It is written for an American
reader – short, straightforward, “CNN-look-
a-like”. However, the Croatian reader will
find it interesting, too. It shows how facts
about the war in Croatia can be stated in a
simple and well-documented way, and dis-
closes some, previously unpublished, facts
about the work of international community.
In the introductory chapter, “My Rude
Awakening: December 15, 1991,”
Blaskovich remembers his first “war-time”
visit to the homeland of his parents
(although the first few paragraphs are too
dramatic). Blaskovich was invited by Foreign
Press Bureu to evaluate the work of medical
services and to investigate the rumors about
the use of chemical weapons. He reviews
the news on the situation on the territory of
former Yugoslavia those days, as well as the
situation in Zagreb – the first air raids,
sniper fire, bombing of the Banski dvori
(Office of the President).
At the beginning of the following chap-
ter, “Legend-Induced Paranoia of the Serbs
and the Hits and Myths of the Croats,”
Blaskovich criticizes the lack of well-
designed media promotion of Croatia.
Croatia’s politicians wasted a lot of energy
retelling the Croatian history to the foreign-
ers “from the seventh century”, instead of
answering the simple question: “What can
we do?” or “What would you like us to do?”
Since the book was written for the American
audience, Blaskovich summarizes historical
facts, crucial for the understanding of events
in former Yugoslavia, as well as the devel-
opment of the idea of “Greater Serbia”
from Garašanin’s “Naèertanije”, through
murder in Parliament, up to the SANU
Memorandum (“the Serbian equivalent of
Mein Kempf”).
The third chapter, “The Road to Voæin”,
describes Tito’s Yugoslavia with special
focus on the late 1980s and the beginning
of 1990s. Blaskovich criticizes the blind-
ness of the international community, and
especially the Bush administration which,
believing in the survival of Yugoslavia,
reacted mildly on the conflict in Slovenia
and the foundation of the Serbian
Autonomous District in Croatia. One part
of this chapter is dedicated to the siege of
Dubrovnik in October 1991, when the
media started asking questions on the
motivation of the Serbian military activities.
The following two chapters, “What
Happened in Voæin” and “Post Mortems of
Slaughter: The Autopsies,” deal with the
best forensically documented crime perpe-
trated on the territory of former Yugoslavia.
On December 13, 1991, the members of
“Beli Orlovi,” Serbian para-military troops,
destroyed the eight centuries old church of
Our Lady in Voæin and massacred the civil-
ians. The post-mortal remains (I choose not
to use the word “body”) of 58 victims were
found, while the remains of many others,
including children, were missing.
Blaskovich’s description of autopsies
begins with the statement that “even the
toughest pathologist is on his knees when
he deals with burned victims.” The sum-
maries of the forensic reports are given.
Tomislav Martinkoviæ, Katica Martinkoviæ,
Marija Šimiæ, Ivan Šimiæ, Marija and Franjo
Matanèiæ, and Stojan Nenadoviæ (a Serb!)
were horrendously tortured before they
were burned alive. The only comfort is the
fact that the tragedy in Voæin was the first
massacre noticed by the media, after four
dozen previous slaughters were ignored.
In chapter 6, “The Devastation of
Osijek and the Smoldering Ashes of
Vukovar,” Blaskovich remembers his visit to
West Slavonia. He witnessed the fight for
Osijek, and the heroic work of the staff in
Book Reviews J. Blaskovich
232 NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE FUTURE 1(1) 2000.
the Osijek General Hospital. Four fifths of
the hospital as ruined and the staff was
moved to the cellar. However, they man-
aged to maintain the rate of secondary
wound infections below 1.7%*. Perhaps the
most tragical fact is that the Yugoslav
People’s Army severely devastated the hos-
pital during the seize of fire (sic!) in
September 1991, bombarding from the
neighboring base.
Blaskovich reconstructs the siege of
Vukovar, the turning point of the war, on the
basis of his conversations with eyewitness-
es. He describes the work in the basement
of the Vukovar General Hospital. I would
like to point out two, almost unbelievable,
acts of enemy troops: artillery attacks to the
central sterilization facility (guided by the
“insiders”), and the attacks on the vehicles
which were taking away the dead to the
cemetery! Part of the chapter describes
forensic work on the identification of the
corpses of the wounded who were taken to
the concentration camps after the fall of
Vukovar. Many of them didn’t survive the
torture.
Chapter 7, “The Media Deception,”
deals with the role of the media in the war
in Croatia. We can learn that the authors of
numerous articles on the war in the
Balkans, published between 1990 and
1995, were “in love” both with former
Yugoslavia and everything it represented.
Press agencies used those articles as a
basis for a number of their reports pub-
lished in the early 1990s. In addition,
Blaskovich describes the excellent work of
Serbian propaganda including hiring many
independent public-relations companies.
For example, General Lewis MacKenzie,
the highest ranking United Nations officer
on the territory of former Yugoslavia, was
donated USD 150,000 by SerbNet, the
official Serbian lobby association in the
United States, during his talks with the rep-
resentatives of the United States Congress.
In the eighth chapter, Blaskovich tries
to answer the question from his introduc-
tion: “Who committed a greater crime –
the one who actually did it or the one who
ignored it?” Trying to expose different lies
published in foreign press, Blaskovich visit-
ed many medical institutions in Croatia. He
describes his experience in working with
refugees and displaced persons. The cru-
cial part of the chapter is the testimony of
Fadila, a woman from Brèko, about the
destruction of that Bosnian city and the
massacre of civilians in Brèko carried out
by the Serbian troops.
“The Infant Democracy’s First Steps” is
the title of chapter 9. Here, Blaskovich
deals with the confusion of the Croatian
press in 1990 and 1991, and with the work
of the Foreign Press Bureau – “the only
bright spot” in Croatia those days.
Although the Foreign Press Bureau con-
tributed significantly in fighting prejudices
against Croatia that were present in the
media, it became the victim of the conflict
of interests of Croatia’s officials. After that,
Blaskovich describes the work of Croatian
associations in the United States whose dif-
ferences eventually led to the loss of both
resources and energy in the fight for domi-
nation.
Chapter 10, “Physicians, Leaders by
Default”, deals with physicians and their
role in the war in Croatia and Bosnia and
Herzegovina. It is very unusual that in such
a short period several physicians made it to
the top of Croatia’s politics. For example:
Zdenko Škrabalo, Branimir Jakšiæ, Ivica
Kostoviæ, Andrija Hebrang, Mate Graniæ,
Goran Dodig, Juraj Njavro, Ivica Kraèun,
Franjo Golem … It is unbelievable coinci-
dence that, at the same time, some leaders
in other parts of Yugoslavia were physicians
too: Milan Paniæ, Milan Babiæ, Radovan
Karad iæ … Moreover, Lord David Owen is
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a physician himself. But, one must agree
with Blaskovich that Owen and Karad iæ
must have been absent when it was time to
take the Hippocratic oath.
Chapter 11, “Conflicts of Interest”,
contains some facts not so known in
Croatia. Lawrence Eagleburger, former
United States Minister of Foreign Affairs,
was very intimate with Yugoslav financial
circles. Lord Peter Carrington became man-
ager and representative of “Kissinger and
Associates,” which transferred hundreds of
millions of American investments in
Yugoslavia. However, neither of them
thought that their financial interests would
interfere with their ability to make objective
judgments about former Yugoslavia.
Blaskovich explains the basis of the embar-
go on the import of weapons to Croatia
and characterizes it as one of the most per-
vert political decisions during the war in
Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. He
also describes the economic sanctions
against Yugoslavia imposed by the United
Nations, as well as Russia breaking the
sanctions and shameless role of Russian
peace keeping forces in Croatia. One of
their most profitable actions was smuggling
oil. The United Nations ignored the smug-
gling, afraid that the Russians might with-
draw from the forces. While talking about
the United Nations, Blaskovich describes
the slaughter of Muslims in Gora de, the
center of the UN security zone. He cites the
article from the Los Angeles Times, describ-
ing how the UN gave the Serbs UN uni-
forms and vehicles. Disguised as UN sol-
diers, the Serbs caught Muslims hiding in
the woods after they fled from Srebrenica.
All those refugees were executed!
In the 12th chapter, “Croatia’s Growing
Pains,” Blaskovich analyzes the failure of the
UNPROFOR mandate in Croatia and the
Z–4 Plan. He analyzes events in 1995, the
military actions “Flash” and “Storm”, which
brought down the Serbian autonomous dis-
trict “Krajina,” and the importance of the
failure of the siege of Bihaæ as well as
Croatia’s involvement in the war in Bosnia
and Herzegovina. In introductory para-
graphs, he reviews the history of Bosnia
and Herzegovina, “the small Yugoslavia.”
He deals with the blindness of the Bosnian
state politics and its total unpreparedness
for the conflict. Although he is not trying to
minimize the sufferings of Muslims during
the war, he explains why the Croats are the
main loosers in the war in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. He also analyzes the reasons
Muslims turned against the Croats. At the
end of the chapter, all the sufferings of the
people of Bosnia are summarized in poem
by Enes Kiševiæ, “Hava’s Plea”.
In the final, fourteenth chapter,
“Dayton: Peace for Our Time?” Blaskovich
describes the Dayton Peace Agreement. He
characterizes the Agreement as a requiem
for Bosnia and Herzegovina, and defines
Serbs as the only winners. He accuses the
international community and the West for
horrors committed on the territory of former
Yugoslavia.
Although it is written for the American
audience, I can recommend “Anatomy of
Deceit” to the readers from Croatia and
neighboring countries. It is simple, but
interesting. Blaskovich dissects the way pol-
itics and media can manipulate the infor-
mation. He discloses all the hypocrisy of
the international community which didn’t
stop the war, although it was able to,
because it was partly seduced by the
ancient myths about the Serbian military
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“Unfinished Peace” is the title of a
study, or rather a Report, published by the
International Commission for the Balkans,
which comprises of a group of eminent
authors. The Report was issued in the
Croatian language in 1997 in Zagreb by
the Croatian Helsinki Committee for
Human Rights FOD B-H. The original
Report was published by the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 1996,
Washington.
The Report claims to be an analysis of
the situation and suggests its own kind of
integral strategy for the international com-
munity toward the area which it calls the
“Balkans”, which incorporates Croatia,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia,
Macedonia, Albania, Bulgaria, Greece
and Turkey. However, Montenegro and
Romania are hardly mentioned in the
Report. Some countries mentioned in the
Report are discussed in elaborate detail as
opposed to others because those countries
represent the two epicentres of conflict in
the Balkans. The first is considered as
“being in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which
incorporates wider Croatian-Serbian rela-
tions,” and the other being in Kosovo,
which is “directly related to Serbia, Albania
and Macedonia… and potentially incorpo-
rates Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey.”
The Report also gives 57 recommen-
dations relating to the conduct of the
above mentioned countries with respect to
the activity of the UN, NATO members, the
US, various bodies of the European Union
and international non-government organi-
zations. The declared wish of the authors of
the Report is for their recommendations to
be completely realized, bringing lasting
peace and prosperity to the Balkans. 
Two hundred pages of text are struc-
tured in a number of sections. The Report
contains an introduction by Lea Tindemans,
the President of the International
Commission for the Balkans, a summary
the Report, an introduction and four chap-
ters entitled, “Balkan Troubles,” “War and
the Reactions of the United Nations”, “The
situation in the Countries, Trends and
Recommendations,” and “The Region –
Conclusions and Recommendations.”
Annexed to the Report are easy-to-survey
maps, a supplement about the study mis-
sion and encounters by the International
Commission for the Balkans, and the epi-
logue by Ivo Banac contained in the
Croatian edition.
The first chapter, metaphorically titled
“Balkan Troubles,” considers the causes of
the recent war, or rather a review of the his-
torical development of the state of affairs in
the countries of the former Yugoslavia
which led to war. As for the historical review
of the events in the Balkans up until the
Second World War given in that chapter,
we cannot help but feel that the Report is
subject to prejudices similar to those that
we come across in literature such as “Grey
Falcon and White Lamb” by Rebecca West.
As for the analysis of the causes for the
235 Book Reviews Unfinished Peace
recent war in Croatia and Bosnia and
Herzegovina given in the same chapter, the
Report does not consider the relevant for-
eign factors for its outbreak, and all the
more categorically states that “the causes of
this war were not outside of the Balkans,
rather inside of it.” The main culprits for the
war, according to the Report, were old
“inherited hatreds”, which due to changing
international surroundings, given the disin-
tegration of communist systems, brought
about crude nationalism. The Report rejects
the thesis about a “conflict of civilizations,”
and accepts that nationalist politicians skil-
fully used, rather abused, the Church and
religious symbols for their own aims.
According to this, the Serbs and Croats
were ascribed to as being nationalistic
politicians, whilst the Moslems “despite all
their shortcomings and mistakes, came the
closest to defending European principles of
tolerance and open societies from those
who, in the name of Christian Europe,
endeavoured to exterminate them,” (p. 22).
The authors of the Report do not mention
nor attempt to explain the phenomena that
during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina
the Moslems fled in the hundreds of thou-
sands to those “who endeavored to exter-
minate them,” i.e., Croatia, which unselfish-
ly sheltered them. We believe that the failure
to mention this is not accidental as it ques-
tions Croatia’s tolerance and openness.
The second chapter, entitled “The War
and the Reactions of the International
Community,” analyses the course of the war
in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina
and the endeavours of the international
community to end it. It is telling that the
aggression in Croatia is depicted very
briefly and bleakly, without mention of the
destruction (apart from Vukovar and
Dubrovnik), while the number of killed (only
2,000 dead in Vukovar is mentioned) and
exiled (only 247,000 is mentioned) Croats
is decreased. Particularly unrealistic and
biased is the part of the Report about the
operations that liberated the occupied
regions of the Republic of Croatia, which
the Report describes as “attacks on
Krajina” that was followed by “a campaign
of ethnic cleansing” (p. 41). Most space
and statistics in this chapter of the Report is
dedicated to the military conflict in Bosnia
and Herzegovina. As a whole, given the
way in which the Report presents the course
of the war, it is hard not to think that this
part of the Report more intensely blames
the Croats for the fighting in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, while it marginalizes the con-
tribution of the Croatian Army in liberating
Bihaæ and parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina
from the Serbian aggressors, which were
the preconditions for the Dayton Accords.
The description of the international
community’s efforts is reasonably objective,
and at times even overtly critical of Western
countries. The events in Slovenia that pre-
ceded the aggression in Croatia are lucid-
ly assessed as being the intentions of the
Serbian politicians in allowing the inde-
pendence of Slovenia, in relation to the
nature of the 1991 Brioni Declaration as a
means for gaining time for the deployment
of the Yugoslav Army in Croatia and Bosnia
and Herzegovina, i.e. preparing for an
aggressive war and the European
Community’s failure to recognize the
nature of the problems. An objective but
brief depiction is given of the endeavours
of the United Nations between 1992 and
1994 in Croatia, i.e. during the period of
the so-called Vance Plan (the UN Secretary
General’s envoy, former US State Secretary,
Cyrus Vance), rather the origins of the Z-4
plan (the draft agreement on Knin, south-
ern Baranja and western Srijem) which the
Serbian side rejected.
The war and participation of the inter-
national community in Bosnia and
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Herzegovina is discussed much more wide-
ly and is given much more importance,
which is best evidenced in the statement,
“the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina pro-
voked the most serious crisis in trans-
Atlantic relations since the Suez crisis…” (p.
55). With geographical maps, all initiatives
were reviewed, from the Vance-Owen plan
from January 1993, the Owen-Stoltenberg
plan from July 1993, the Contact Group
plan from July 1994, to the Dayton Accord
from November of 1995. Nevertheless, the
entire chapter leaves the perception of a
greater contribution by NATO compared to
the inefficiency of the EU, rather the EC.
Significant criticism is given of western
countries in not recognizing the aggres-
sion, the indecisiveness and use of force
and generally for inaction in preventing the
conflict. Criticism for belated action in light
of defending safe areas is clear but
remains fairly unclear in light of the state-
ment given in the Report; “no attention was
directed toward constructive ideas for
transforming Yugoslavia from a communist
federation to a democratic one…” (p. 56)
and even the hypothesis that Croatia was
recognized prematurely as “recognition
excluded from play the important lever with
which Croatia could have been restrained
in its conduct toward the Serbs in Krajina”
(p. 60). Does this mean that the authors of
the Report consider that Yugoslavia could
have been, with more determined partici-
pation from the West, safeguarded from
disintegration?
It is particularly worth highlighting the
lack of recognising the decisive role of the
Croatian Army operation in 1995 in
achieving the Dayton Accord. This most
likely stems from not knowing the principle
facts, for how can one explain formulations
such as “the successful offensive of Bosnian
and Croatian forces in Western Slavonia”
(p. 73).
The third chapter, “The Situation in the
Countries, Trends and Recommendations”,
together with the fourth chapter, “The
Region Conclusions and Recommen-
dations”, are the most important and most
pretentious parts to the Report. These
chapters, along with an analysis of the sit-
uation and detailed explanations, give 57
explicit recommendations concerning the
function of the UN, NATO, the US, and var-
ious bodies of the European Union, inter-
national non-government organizations
and the countries in the “region” them-
selves. All the recommendations in the
Report can be organized in a number of
groups; security, reconstruction and devel-
opment, democracy (civil society and
media), inter-ethnic relations and conduct
toward minorities, and regional coopera-
tion. The recommendations in the third
chapter are directed individually toward the
countries in the region, while the recom-
mendations in the fourth chapter are main-
ly directed toward the region as a whole. It
is interesting that, judging by the number
and content of the recommendations given
in the third chapter, the Report considers
Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic
of Croatia as being the most problematic
countries.
Ten recommendations directly concern
Bosnia and Herzegovina. In stating that in
the Dayton solution “there exists a hidden
contradiction” as it “accepts the ethnic divi-
sion of Bosnia and Herzegovina which was
achieved with the help of military force”
and at the same time wishes to “protect
and reintegrate the pre-war multiethnic
Bosnia” (p. 78), the Report also reveals the
meaning of some recommendations as
being a means for supplementing, rather
redefining, Dayton. The final aim of the
recommendations is the entire reconstruc-
tion of multiethnic Bosnia, i.e. avoiding the
possibility of separating the three sides in
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Bosnia and Herzegovina into three separate
states. With this end in mind, the Report rec-
ommends the military presence of the inter-
national community, supporting joint institu-
tions, i.e. non-government organizations,
complying to the obligations of the tribunal
in The Hague, freedom of the media, the
economic reconstruction of the country,
strengthening the civil aspect of the West’s
presence, achieving the right of refugees for
return, etc.
Five recommendations relate to the
Republic of Croatia. Following a very critical
exposition on Croatia, broad assessments
and inaccurate consternations, the Report
concludes how “much more stringent meas-
ures must be applied to this country” (p.
106). The recommendations suggest that
the US Government demand(s) of the
Republic of Croatia an improvement in its
relations toward minorities, the return of
refugee Serbs, the complete freedom of the
media, decentralization and regionalism,
and dissolving Herceg-Bosna along with
“taking a share of the economic recovery of
Bosnia and Herzegovina.” 
Serbia is termed as the “most important
state in South-eastern Europe” and is given
surprisingly little recommendation. The
Report suggests the implementation of the
Dayton Accords, extraditing war criminals,
accepting the draft agreement on succes-
sion, freedom of the media, and devising
the western strategy for recognizing a new
Yugoslavia and its inclusion in international
institutions.
Four recommendations are dedicated
to Kosovo. They encompass the return of
autonomy, abstaining from independence
and a start to negotiations, and the return of
normal civil life through the work of non-
government organizations.
Three recommendations pertain to
Albania: pro-western orientation, the build-
ing of infrastructure and joining with the
Balkans and not Islamic countries.
Macedonia must increase the propor-
tion of Albanians in its government, decen-
tralize, and retain UNPREDEP so as to
decrease the tensions around the university
in Tetovo.
As for Montenegro, Bulgaria, Greece
and Turkey, there are no particular recom-
mendations. Romania is not at all men-
tioned.
It can be concluded that in its review of
the situation in individual countries in the
region, i.e. before drafting the recommen-
dations, the Commission acted with bias
and impartially. How else can the consider-
ably more critical stance toward some
countries in comparison to others be
explained, that is passing over in silence
the evident violations of human rights per-
petrated by some and magnified in others.
Why is it that for some countries, where
even laymen can perceive great problems,
no recommendations are given at all?
The 28th recommendation given in the
fourth chapter is dedicated to the region as
a whole. It relates to the problems of
regional cooperation, economic coopera-
tion, reconstruction and development,
democracy in relation to civil society and
the media, multi-ethnic relations and con-
duct toward minorities, and security, i.e. the
control of armaments. All imply the impor-
tance of creating a regional framework for
resolving potentially dangerous issues and
controversies, i.e. the need to strengthen
the role of non-government organizations
in the region.
Concerning the abovementioned rec-
ommendations, from today’s perspective,
four years after the first Report was issued,
importance is drawn to the fact that never-
theless the conduct of the international
community toward the countries encom-
passed in the Report coincide in some ele-
ments with the recommendations given in
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this Report. Realized in particular are rec-
ommendations concerning the reinforce-
ment of “civil society,” that is the role of
non-government organizations. This indi-
cates that the recommendations of the
Commission are taken seriously. We won’t
dwell on the question why this is so. What
are the consequences of the moves taken
under those recommendations provokes
another question. 
It is particularly important to emphasize
the relatively mild judgements and small
demands made upon the Serbs in compar-
ison to the very sharp judgment of Croatia.
In this light it would be very revealing, in a
separate study, to compare the first Report
of the International Commission for the
Balkans of the Carnegie Foundation from
1914 with the events that transpired later in
the “Balkan” region in the context of the
First and Second World Wars. The authors
themselves in the introduction to this Report
recognize the fact that the views of the first
and second Commissions are similar.
The first Report from 1914 and this one
published in 1996 are equally concerned
and have the justified conclusion (and their
lack of will) of the urgency for the timely
engagement of Europe and the US in
resolving problems in the Balkans. 
Unfortunately, those who share consid-
eration of the civilizational superiority,
rather intellectual arrogance, prevent an
objective, empathetic perception of the
problems in the countries of the region.
What to say about the first Report which
states that the “civilization layer is very thin
and that the liberation of the beast in man
is always possible when force turns patriot-
ism into crime and heroism into savagery,”
but that they were prophetic, not only in the
relations in the Balkans but in the relations
of all participating countries of the First and
Second World Wars. The objective percep-
tion of the Balkan issues can only be
shaped by a commission that accepts the
“thin civilizational layer” as inherent in
every man in every country in the world,
even (as was shown by the events during
the two world wars) in the developed West.
In any case, the individual moves
made by the international community after
1996, intentional or accidental, coincide
with the recommendations in the Report. At
the same time, some important moves by
the international community, such as the
bombing of Serbia because of the events in
Kosovo, are not at all predicted nor sug-
gested in the Report.
Generally viewed, the Report is super-
ficial where the Republic of Croatia is con-
cerned. For example, the Report correctly
concludes that “leading international pow-
ers, up until the summer of 1995, were not
prepared to convincingly threaten force so
as to enforce a solution”, that is that they
were late. However, the aforementioned is
written in the context of the killings in
Srebrenica, whilst it does not mention the
recent war crimes during the aggression
against Croatia. Already in this approach
to the problem, it is evident that Croatia is
considered within a welter of Balkan events
and whose politics primarily bring about
the consequences in the Balkans, in com-
parison to Slovenia (which is altogether not
mentioned in the Report). Croatia is not
considered as a country that has powerful
roots and powerful contacts in the Central
European region. Croatia is not perceived
as a bridge between Europe and the
Balkans, rather only as an integral part of
the Balkans. This sort of consideration
about Croatia does not give the true pic-
ture and does not find a useful solution, not
only for Croatia, but also for the entire
Balkans and the Central European region.
In considering the reasons as to what
prompted the establishment of this study, by
all means assuming the commendable
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desire to assist the region, the thesis on the
possible influence of fighting in the region
and the events in other countries in Eastern
Europe and the former USSR mentioned in
the introductory summary of the Report itself
must also be taken into consideration: “The
worsening multi-ethnic relations and the
ever worsening situation for national
minorities in the Balkans would have nega-
tive consequences in other parts of Eastern
Europe and the former Soviet Union, where
demography does not coincide with politi-
cal borders. Moreover, the fate of the
Muslims – their political integration or isola-
tion – could become an acid test of rela-
tions between Europe and the Islamic
world.” Not disputing the justification of this
argument, it is nonetheless difficult, four
years after the end to the serious fighting in
the region and writing of this Report, to note
a more serious link between the events in
Bosnia and Herzegovina and current events
in Chechnya.
In any case, most likely the important
reason for writing the Report lies also in the
concern for possible implications of the
events in Bosnia and Herzegovina with an
important NATO member – Turkey. The
Report itself states that the “Bosnian issue
has become the powerful weapon in the
hands of Turkish Islamists who at present
have the position of presidency in the gov-
ernment and, who have achieved success
upon success on the domestic political
stage, which is without precedence in
Turkish contemporary history” (cit. summary
XXVI).
Numerous incorrect citations in the
Report are most likely the fruit of a number
of previously shaped strong stances, so
strong that they have become the prejudg-
ment and limit the scope, and inhibit the
freedom and innovation, of the recommen-
dations themselves.
The first is the strong beliefs in the inca-
pability of the countries in the region to
solve their mutual problems on their own,
that is the belief that they cannot solve
those problems without various forms,
including military, of western intervention.
The Report even directly suggests the “unin-
terrupted and consistent military arrange-
ment of NATO” up until the establishment
of the “Balkan Partnership for Peace asso-
ciation.” This stance is expressed at the very
beginning of the Report, already in the sec-
ond paragraph of the summarised review
in the introduction. Namely, the statement
that, “this Commission believes that, if we
pretend that we do not see the problems in
the Balkans, it will be shown that it will be
the equally successful recipe for a catastro-
phe at the end to the twentieth century as it
was at its start. Foreign sponsors and even
the factors which forcefully impose peace
will have to remain in that region for a long
time,” clearly shows that the Commission
does not wish to recognise that the main
cause of the problems in the region even
prior to the outbreak of World War One
was not only the historical inheritance of
the peoples in the region, rather the
“Balkan ethnic conflicts,” but that that to a
large extent was the interests of factors out-
side the region, primarily the Ottoman and
Austrian empires and up until the present
day, which obstructs free individualization
and development of the countries in the
region. 
The Report foresees that almost all the
conflicts in the region were quickly initiat-
ed, primarily at the times of confrontation
of the great powers in this region. In that
context it is completely correct to state that
this region is an eternal battleground for
the interests of the great powers, and when
these battles come ablaze they remind us
of Samuel P. Huntington’s “conflict of civi-
lizations”. As opposed to that, the Report
relativises the aforementioned by stating
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that “renewed nationalistic conflicts reflect
the ambitions of the great powers to rein-
state their sphere of influence in the
Balkans,” merely as an “attitude in which
many in the Balkans believe.” At the same
time the theory that “the issue deals with a
resurgence of ancient hatred and a resur-
gence of repressed nations” is given as an
“interpretation that is widespread in the
West.” 
Subsequently the authors of the Report
synthesize the aforementioned by stating,
“there is some truth to all of this and
nobody should underestimate the impor-
tance of history in the Balkans. However,
the main reasons for this war were that the
sparks of aggressive nationalism were
stirred by those political leaders of the
Yugoslav federation who, in their desire to
realize their own nationalistic aims,
appealed to ancient hatreds and who
intentionally set in motion their own propa-
ganda machinery…” (cit. summary p. XVI).
The second prejudice emanates from
the first, which is the belief in equal guilt for
the fighting in the region. One would have
to be truly blind not to be able to differen-
tiate between the aggressor (Serbia) and
the victims (Croatia, Bosnia and
Herzegovina), or not be able to recognize
which of the countries of the former
Yugoslavia had the necessary means for
aggression (armament) at the beginning of
the nineties and the aspiration for domina-
tion over others (the ideology of Greater
Serbia). There is no differentiation between
the negative aggressive nationalism that
was based on a desire to conquer and
dominate over others, and nationalism as
a defensive reaction to protect one’s own
existence from the aggression of the other.
The third prejudice is the belief that the
synthesis, rather various forms of linking
and integration as opposed to the sover-
eignty of states in the region, automatically
contributes to solving the problem. History
tells us otherwise; the bloodiest conflicts
originated directly from the downfall of old
or the formation of new – either forcefully
or artificially created – ’integration’ entities
in this region (Ottoman Empire, Austro-
Hungary, both Yugoslav states).
Nonetheless, in regards to regional
cooperation the Commission recommends,
but also doubts, in the “possibility of main-
taining an international conference on
security in the Balkans, and even an ambi-
tious conferences that would have the aim
of creating a south-Balkan confederation,”
(p. 140). The Commission recommends
the formation of “free trade zones” as
being the most realistic and economically
most useful solution, which would in the
end become a part of CEFTA.
It is even more uncertain of how they
plan on implementing one of the key pro-
posals in the Report in regards to creating
“a Partnership for Peace Balkan associa-
tion” and its “linking to the broader struc-
tures of NATO,” (recommendation No. 53,
p. 170).
Instead of the conclusion, let’s return to
the beginning, the title; “Report of the
Commission for the Balkans.”
When we state “Report” we ask – for
whom? Normally, for those who paid. In
this case, among others, the Carnegie
Foundation and the Open Society Institute.
Neither is a government organization or
institute, which opens a series of interesting
questions on the mutual relations of the
mentioned non-government organizations
and the governments of specific countries,
and even the possible influences of these
organizations on the governments them-
selves.
When we state “commission” we ask –
what kind? This one is comprised of
undoubtedly eminent experts, intellectuals
and politicians (Leo Tindemans - President,
Lloyd Cutler, Bronislaw Geremek, John
Roper, Theo Sommer, Simone Veil, David
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Anderson). Our questions in an atmosphere
of support for multiculturalism, equality and
objectivity are: why is it that not one of the
seven members of the Commission on the
Balkans does not originate from the
Balkans, and why is it that only one of the
Commission’s 21 advisors originates from
the countries of the former Yugoslavia?
When we state “Balkans” we ask – what
is it and where is it? This Report does not
even attempt to differentiate between where
Asia begins and where the Balkans ends,
but it does suggest that Europe ends and
the Balkans begins at the Slovenian-
Croatian border. This is an assertion with
which numerous Croats would not agree,
and which could evoke antagonism toward
the Report, regardless of the value of the
work of the Commission and the usefulness
of individual recommendations, notwith-
standing a certain intellectual arrogance
within the Commission.
Predrag Haramija, Zagreb, Croatia
